The effects of contractual relationships on investment incentives in complementary goods market by Karadayı, Sinan & Karadayi, Sinan
THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS ON INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES IN COMPLEMENTARY GOODS MARKET
by
Sinan Karadayı
Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Sabancı University
August 2008
THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS ON INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES IN COMPLEMENTARY GOODS MARKET
APPROVED BY:
Asst. Prof. Dr. Toker Dog˘anog˘lu
(Thesis Supervisor)
Asst. Prof. Dr. Fırat I˙nceg˘lu
Asst. Prof. Dr. O¨zgu¨r Gu¨rbu¨z
DATE OF APPROVAL: ........................................
c©Sinan Karadayı 2008
All Rights Reserved
dedicated to my beloved deceased father...
i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all those who gave me support
towards the completion of this thesis. First of all, my advisor Professor Toker
Dog˘anog˘lu was really helpful at every step of my thesis. He was stimulating with his
supports, he encouraged me with his sincerity. I am very thankful to him for
everything he has done for me.
I also want to thank my lovely family. I always felt privileged to be a member of this
big family. They always supported me and their existence gave me the power to
struggle with all the challenges.
Besides, my close friends; Ilke Toygu¨r, Elif Tu¨re, Ferhan Tu¨re and Merve Akbas¸ were
always with me. I thank them for their amity.
Lastly I want to thank The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey
for providing me the necessary funds for completing my thesis.
ii
THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS ON INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES IN COMPLEMENTARY GOODS MARKET
Sinan Karadayı
Economics, MA Thesis, 2008
Asst. Prof. Toker Dog˘anog˘lu
Keywords: Complementary Goods, Quality, Investment incentives
ABSTRACT
This paper tries to suggest some solutions to the debate on net neutrality where con-
tent providers and access providers in tandem produce a composite good; Internet ser-
vice. Both content providers and excess providers contribute to their own component’s
quality and the quality that the internet users conceive depends on both components’
qualities.
In our model, this debate is generalized to complementary goods market where final
goods are composite goods comprising two components. The producers of the compo-
nents contribute to the quality of their components where the value of the composite
good is determined with a function of the qualities of components. We assumed; one
firm’s benefit per consumer is a exogenous constant, and the other gets benefit from
pricing consumers for the final good. In the model, we investigate how introducing a
price mechanism between the firms effects their investment decisions.
We found out that the optimal solution for net neutrality debate can be found by
examining how the qualities of components are related to each other on determining
the quality of internet service. If the qualities are more close to being complementary
to each other, a positive price between the content providers and access providers is
welfare improving.
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TAMAMLAYICI U¨RU¨NLER PI˙YASASINDA SO¨ZLES¸MELERI˙N YATIRIM
TES¸VI˙KLERI˙NE ETKI˙SI˙
Sinan Karadayı
Ekonomi, MA Tezi, 2008
Yar. Doc¸. Dr. Toker Dog˘anog˘lu
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tamamlayıcı U¨ru¨nler, Kalite, Yatırım Tes¸vikleri
O¨ZET
Bu tez internet servisi hakkındaki yog˘un olarak tartıs¸ılmakta olan bir konuyu incele-
mektedir. I˙c¸erik sag˘layıcıları ile eris¸im sag˘layıcıları arasında bir fiyat varlıg˘ının topluma
yararlı olup olmayacag˘ına dair c¸o¨zu¨mler o¨nermeye c¸alıs¸maktadır.
Kurdug˘umuz modelde bu tartıs¸ma daha genel bir c¸erc¸evede; tamamlayacı u¨ru¨nler
piyasasında incelenmis¸tir. Bu piyasada ortaya c¸ıkan biles¸ik u¨ru¨nler iki parc¸adan olus¸mak-
tadır. Her parc¸ayı u¨reten firma kendi parc¸asının kalitesine yatırım yapmaktadır ve
biles¸ik u¨ru¨nu¨n kalitesi iki parc¸anın da kalitesine bag˘lı bir fonksiyon ile belirlenir. Mode-
limizde, bir firmanın her bir biles¸ik u¨ru¨n kullanıcısından aldıg˘ı yarar sabit olarak varsayı-
lırken, dig˘er firmanın ise kullanıcıları kendilerinin belirledig˘i bir fiyat ile u¨cretlendirebildi-
g˘i varsayılmıs¸tır.
Kurdug˘umuz modelle buldug˘umuz sonuc¸; internet servisi hakkındaki tartıs¸maya
c¸o¨zu¨mu¨n parc¸aların kalitelerinin nasıl birbirleriyle ilis¸kilendirildig˘inin aras¸tırılması yolu
ile bulunabileceg˘ini o¨ngo¨rmektedir. Eg˘er parc¸aların kaliteleri internet servisinin kalitesini
belirlemede daha c¸ok tamamlayıcı o¨zellik go¨stermekte ise, ic¸erik sag˘lıyıcıları ile eris¸im
sag˘layıcıları arasında pozitif bir fiyatın olması toplumun refah seviyesini arttırıcı nite-
liktedir.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Composite Goods Markets
”Each rational person buys a product if its benefit exceeds its cost” This is the
most basic teaching of economics. Demand of consumers for a product is derived by this
basic idea. As the properties of a particular product are improved, the consumers get
more benefit and accept to pay more. Therefore the firms make investments to increase
their product’s value for higher profits. In competitive markets, since profit margins
are small, the incentives on investment are not very large. However if the firm is a
monopolist, he does not compete with any other firms, therefore he can contribute to
quality more. For example, the firm of Porsche improves its car’s quality very frequently
because it differentiated itself from other car brands and became a monopolist. The
philosophy “Porsche Principle knows no upwards limits” explains how much they care
about the quality.
Like in above example, the monopolist only takes into account the consumers
and its cost function while making decision on quality investments. On the other
hand, there are duopoly or oligopolistic markets where the firms have to consider other
firms’ decisions. Complementary goods markets are examples of this where produced
components are complements for each other. Therefore producer of each component of
a composite good takes into account other firms’ decisions when he is investing in its
quality.
There are many examples of complementary good markets having goods compris-
ing two or more components. In some of these composite goods, the components are
produced by the same firm and in some of them they are produced by different firms.
A final good has a value if it has its all components, if one component does not exist,
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consumers will not prefer to buy the composite good. In these markets, each compo-
nent has its own quality and the components’ qualities determine the quality of the
composite goods, therefore the firms of different components have to make strategic
moves on how much to invest on the quality of its own component to maximize profits.
Moreover, the incentive on investment for each firm is closely related to whether the
components’ contributions to the value of the final good are substitutes or complements.
For example, a computer is composite good comprising hardware and software. These
two components’ contributions to quality can be thought as complementary to each
other. We call this kind of components quality complements. The computer’s quality is
the minimum quality of hardware and software, because if the computer does not have
a hardware of sufficient technology, the user can not enjoy many software applications.
That is the reason why the software improvements in computer markets trigger the
investments in hardware production. In other words, in a setting where components
are quality complements, if the firm of one component does not invest in quality, the
other firm has no incentive to increase its quality level. On the other hand, there are
composite goods containing quality substitute components like a lecture. A lecture has
both the lecturer and learning material contributing to the quality of the lecture. Both
components’ effect on the student’s learning is almost independent of the other compo-
nents’s quality. Therefore in a market where the components are quality substitutes,
the composite good’s quality is the sum of qualities of all components, and even the
firm of one component does not invest in quality, the other firm may prefer to invest
to increase its profit.
The firms of the components strategically respond to the investment decisions
of each others. When they integrate with each other they can internalize the external
benefit of their investment decisions, therefore integrated monopolist of different compo-
nent producers increases the profits and consumer surplus compared to a disintegrated
monopolists, and also if they don’t integrate, they provide lower quality level of the
composite good in a market where components are complements. In Related Literature
chapter the arguments on complementary goods markets are briefly explained.
This paper’s main interest is about the price mechanism between the firms and
its implications on improving the total welfare of the society, rather than the vertical
integration option. The focus is on a specific type of composite good comprising two
components where only one firm charges the consumer for the final good and the other
firm has external benefit for each consumer using the final good. The newspaper markets
have this kind of structure. A newspaper has its content about politics, magazine and
daily life, besides it has commercial ads. The content and the commercial ads are
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two components of a newspaper. The owner of the commercial ads do not charge
the newspaper readers, only the newspaper owner charges the readers, however as
the number of readers increases, more people see the ads, and more costumers will
buy the advertised product. So the owner of the ads externally gets benefit from
newspaper readers without charging them. Furthermore, the newspaper owner charges
the advertisement owners for their external benefit. In an exact manner, the markets
where the interaction between the firms of components and consumers are modeled like
the above example are called Two Sided Markets.
1.2 Two Sided Markets
Two sided markets has its own specifications and it differs from the composite
goods markets in some points. Two sided markets include two groups and a platform.
The groups are sellers and buyers. They interact with each other via platform. Besides,
an agent’s benefit for joining the platform depends on the number of agents of the other
group joining to the platform. The platform can charge both sides to maximize its own
profit.
Video game platforms are typical example of two sided markets, where game
developers are the sellers, game console is the platform, and game players are the buyers.
Consumers play video games via game console. As the number of game developers
increases, the game players get more utility from the game console, and as the number
of consumers increases, game developers will prefer to produce more games. So the game
console producers have to attract both sides, to maximize its own profit. Therefore the
platform’s price mechanism is really important for the wellbeing of the society.
Each agent of a group exerts externality on the member of the other group. There-
fore, platform’s eagerness to attract the agents of a group depends on the size of the
externality. Usually these externalities are fixed to constant parameters which means
one side get a constant benefit for each agent of other group joining to the platform.
The pricing mechanism for this kind of markets are analyzed by Armstrong and Roche
- Tirole which enlighten our work on complementary goods markets. Their arguments
are explained in Related Literature chapter extensively.
Basically, in two sided markets, the seller side and the platform are producing a
composite good in tandem for the buyer; the games and game console are components
of the composite good for the game players. So, the composite good’s quality that
the buyer side conceives is related to both the seller side’s quality and the platforms’s
quality. In our specific model, each buyer exerts positive constant externality on the
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seller side while paying the platform for using the composite good.
1.3 The Debate On World Wide Web
This paper’s main motivation comes from a debate on a specific two sided market
where the buyer side’s utility depends on the quality investment decisions of seller side
and platform. These decisions together determine the quality of the final good. The
specific two sided market where the platform and the seller side can be thought as firms
of two components of a composite good is; World Wide Web.
World Wide Web changed our lives very much. We can easily acquire and offer
knowledge, we can reach to many goods and services from all over the world while
sitting in front of our computers. We can watch videos, download songs, communicate
with our friends who are living abroad. So we can say that internet is one of the
indispensable things of our daily lives. For this reason the quality of the internet is
quite important for the society.
In internet there are three groups; content providers like google, skype, facebook;
access providers like Turk Telecom; and the internet users. With a two sided market
approach, the content providers are the sellers, the internet users are the buyers, and
the access providers are the platforms. Internet users reach to the contents of google,
skype and all other web sites, through the networks of access providers. Most of the
content providers do not charge the internet users. They get external benefit when
the users visit their web sites, because as the number of visitors increases more people
see the advertisements on the web sites, and the content providers can charge the
advertisement owners’ more. On the other hand the access providers do not charge
the content providers, but charge the internet users. As the number of internet users
increase the content providers’ utilities increase, also as the content variety increases
the internet users gain more benefit.
Internet users’ utilities depend on the quality of the internet service which com-
prises the network and content. For instance, when a person is watching a video on
youtube; the resolution level of the content which is provided by the content provider,
and the speed of download which is provided by access provider are two factors deter-
mining the conceived value of that video. Like in all composite goods, both network’s
and content’s qualities contribute to the quality of internet service. Therefore the price
mechanism between these component producers is crucial for the investment incentives
on quality.
At the time being the access providers do not charge the content providers. The
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internet is neutral. However, net neutrality proponents and opponents are debating
on whether the access providers should charge the content providers for using their
network.
In Federal Trade Commission [2007], Bob Pepper, the senior managing director
of Global Advanced Technology Policy at Cisco Systems says1;
Services like web browsing e-mail, instant messaging, Voice over IP, and low-
quality streaming video do not require high broadband speeds, and with a few exceptions,
can actually tolerate interruptions and short delays in transmission. Dumb networks
that merely send packets along and randomly drop packets during periods of congestion
have been mostly sufficient to handle these types of applications. But they’re not going
to be sufficient if we are to realize the potential, full potential, of Web 2.0, which will
focus on new applications like high quality video, user-generated content, multi-media
applications.
According net neutrality opponents like Bob Pepper these new applications are
going to require a wide broadband internet service which will allow the consumers to
enjoy the applications without delay and interruptions. In his arguments he wants to
highlight the fact that, access providers have to make big investments on their quality
to keep up with the new generation contents, otherwise the internet users will not be
able to enjoy these applications. Therefore the net neutrality opponents believe that the
content providers should give money to the access providers to increase their incentives
on investment and advance the internet’s quality to a sufficient level.
On the other hand, net neutrality proponents believe that the reason why internet
became so successful lies under its neutrality property. They assert that one of the most
important property of internet is that the contents are reachable for every network in
all around the world. If content providers have to make contracts with local access
providers, the contents will be out of reach in places where the parties could not agree
on the price. Also proponents assert that making contracts with each local access
provider will be time consuming and costly. So they claim that, content providers
should not spend time and money on the contracts, but they should spend time and
money on innovation for increasing their content’s quality. When they increase the
content quality, they believe that more people will prefer to use internet which will
indirectly increases the access providers’ profits.
To sum up, net neutrality proponents argue that there should be no contracts
between the content providers and access providers. They believe content providers’
investments create sufficient incentives for investment in quality for access providers
1In [FTC, 2007] Workshop
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because, as they together invest in final quality of internet service, the access providers
will receive higher demands for their networks, and they can compensate their invest-
ment costs through charging more internet users with higher prices. On the other hand
opponents say without access providers’ investment on their networks’ qualities, the
users will not be able to enjoy the high quality contents, therefore access providers’ in-
vestment costs must be compensated partially by the content providers, if they increase
access providers’ investment incentives, people’s utilities from high quality contents will
be higher, so more people will visit those contents and content providers’ utilities will
increase.
1.4 The Outline of The Thesis
There are many composite goods markets like internet comprising two compo-
nents, where one firm externally benefits from the end users, while the other firm
charges the end users. In following chapters, we will model this kind of composite
goods market where the composite good’s quality is determined via a value function
of the components’ qualities. We will compare the situation when there are not any
contracts between the firms and when there are. First we will analyze the market when
the qualities of components are perfect complements, after when the qualities of com-
ponents are perfect substitutes. Under some conditions, we will show that the effects
of introducing price mechanism between the firms of components depend on how the
value function is set. In addition, the equilibrium contract decision between the firms
and welfare maximizing price will be investigated. We will compare the findings of
quality components case with the finding of quality substitute case and with the help of
this comparison, we will comment on Net Neutrality Debate. Finally we will discuss
how our modeling can be extended for two sided markets where there are many sellers
and buyers, and more than one platform and we will finish the thesis with a conclusion
part which will summarize our work briefly and our contributions to the literature.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter we will try to summarize and explain some of the papers related to
my thesis. The dynamics of our model, i. e. the cost structure, the settings of profit
functions, utility functions, the quality arguments are determined with the help of these
papers. In our work there are two relevant literature; complementary goods market and
two sided markets.
2.1 Complementary goods market
The dynamics of complementary goods market are very much concern of economists. In
our model, there are two complementary components and two different firms producing
them. Therefore we benefited from different papers, especially for setting the utility
function for consumers, including the innovation and investment arguments into my
thesis.
In [Economides, 1999] the simple case where only one composite good is demanded
was analyzed. They compared the quality levels when the components are owned by
the same producer with quality levels when each component is produced by different
producer.
In their model, they considered a market where the composite good AB comprises
one unit of A and one unit of B. The quality of the composed good is the minimum
of the qualities of components. They assumed the utilities of the consumers increase
with quality and decrease with price. For the demand function they introduced a
heterogeneity parameter, therefore the utility function is;
UΘ = Θq − p
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where q stands for the quality, θ is the heterogeneity parameter which is assumed to be
distributed on [0, 1] and p represents the price.
We used a similar utility function for consumers, but in our model we introduced
the heterogeneity in a different way which is;
Ui = q − p− ξi.
Also we used a similar aspect for determining the value of the composite good.
They concluded that if the components’ producers integrate and become a mo-
nopolist they will contribute to quality more than disintegrated monopolists. Also they
will gain higher profits. Besides the price of the composite good will be lower in markets
where the components are produced by same producers. Therefore integration is pareto
improving. In disintegrated ownership, the quality improvements has higher impacts
on price level, therefore, firms set lower qualities and have the same price impact.
The reason of their finding is very much related to double marginalization. In
[Cournot, 1927] it is explained that if the quality levels are the same, the dual monop-
olists can not appropriate the full benefit of price decrease. However if they integrate
they will internalize the external benefit of price decrease. This is the double marginal-
ization and it leads to higher pricer.
Cournot’s model was the same as the [Economides, 1999] where there is a com-
posite good comprising two components. They analyzed the pricing strategies of two
disintegrated monopolists and concluded that if they integrate they will set the price
lower. And in [Sonnenschein, 1968] it is explained that that Cournot’s duopoly argu-
ments are also valid in complementary good markets.
Another paper on complementary goods is [Economides and Salop, 1992]. In their
work they analyzed the composite good market, where there are multiple brands of
compatible components. They compared the prices of joint ownership to independent
ownership prices.
In their model each composite good comprises one unit of A and one unit of B.
There are m differentiated producers of A and n differentiated producers of B. They
found that if a producer of A integrates with a producer of B under some conditions
prices can increase.1 Mainly the effect of the integration depends on the sizes of the cross
partials of demand. Besides they analyzed different market structures where horizontal
or vertical externalities can be internalized. In the paper above, there are no quality
arguments, but the analysis with increased number of brands of components and their
price analysis are quite concern of our research topic.
1see also [Matutes and Regibeau, 1988] and [Economides, 1989]
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The innovation incentives in composite goods are also investigated in another pa-
per. In [Farrell and Katz, 2000] they analyzed the systems comprising two components,
one of which is monopolized.
In their model the composite good AB comprises one unit of A and one unit of B.
There is a single producer of A labeled M which may also or may not produce B. There
is at least one independent producer of B. They tried to answer whether the monopoly
will prefer to extract the efficiency rents in the market of component B. They concluded
that M chooses to produce B component and decreases the price of it, because with
this price squeeze M can gain more profits by charging consumers with higher prices
for A.
In our model, like in above papers the composite goods have value if they are
used together. On the other hand, there are some complementary goods where each
component is valuable even though they are used without its complement. For example
in their paper [Chen and Nalebuff, 2006] they analyzed the market where one good is
essential for the use of other but not vice versa. In their model there are two components
A and B and they produced by different monopolists. A has a value itself, but B has
value only if it is used with A. Actually their main motivation comes from the debate
on the policy of Microsoft. They tied their Windows operator system with Internet
Explorer. In their model they found out that the optimal strategy of the monopolist
producer of A is to produce a similar version of B and to give them for free or acquire
firm B and set the price equal to 0.
There is another paper [Choi, 2004] where they analyzed the tying policy of Mi-
crosoft. In their paper they investigated the effects of tying decisions on R&D invest-
ment incentives. They found that if the firms ties two products, it can commit more
aggressive investments. Therefore tying option can provide higher quality levels of the
tied goods and can increase the wellbeing of consumers.
2.2 Two sided goods market
The two sided markets literature was helpful for determining how we are going to set
the profit functions. The main papers we investigated for the dynamics of two sided
markets are explained in this part.
In [Armstrong, 2005] the dynamics of two sided markets are extensively analyzed.
In his work he tried to find how the platform sets profit maximizing prices. In his model,
there are two groups and they interact with each other via platforms. The utility of
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each agent is introduced such;
uij = αjin
i + ζ ij
Here ni is the number of agents from the other side who are present on platform i, α
i
j
is the benefit that agent j enjoys from interacting with each agent on the other side,
and ζ ij is the fixed benefit the agent obtains from using that platform. In his paper he
assumed α is the same for every agent of a group, and the heterogeneity is sustained
via ζ. However in [Rochet and Tirole, 2003] the heterogeneity is given by α.
With above assumptions in Armstrong’s work, the utilities of the groups are
introduced such;
ui1 = α1n
i
2 − pi1 ui2 = α2ni1 − pi2
where u1 and u2 are utilities of two groups and p values are the prices they give to the
platforms. i stands for different platform. He assumed that the demand functions are
increasing functions of these utility functions.
In his analysis he first investigated the equilibrium price when there is only one
platform and concluded that the group whose elasticity is high or the external benefit
that they exert on the other group is large are charged with smaller prices compared
to other group.
In following chapter he increased the number of platforms and analyzed the pricing
dynamics, and he concluded that the determinants of the equilibrium prices are the
magnitudes of cross group externalities, the way of how fees are levied and whether the
agents join one or more platform.
In our model, we used a similar utility function for the firm which externality
benefits from the consumers. Therefore his analysis on prices enlightened our work
very much.
Furthermore we benefited from [Rochet and Tirole, ][2005] since their work pro-
vided a better understanding of two sided markets. In most of papers, two sided markets
are introduced with a “you know a two sided market when you see it” flavor. However
in their work the definition of two-sided market is precisely given. They say that two
sided markets are the markets where not only the total of prices charged to buyers and
seller matters, but the structure also matters. They gave examples of markets which
can be examples of two sided markets and which can not. For instance a firm pays its
labor wage and it sells products to consumers, so we can say that consumers reach to
to workers via platform. However this market is not two sided, because the structure
of pricing does not effect the wellbeing of society. Also they proved that Coase the-
orem is necessary for being two sidedness. They tried investigate effects of having a
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membership benefit and usage benefit at the same time with a model like this:
U i = (bi − ai)N j +Bi − Ai
where bi is the benefit of consumer i interacting with each agent from other side, ai is
per user charge, Bi is the membership benefit and Ai is the membership cost. They
figured out the optimal pricing strategies of the platform.
The multi homing option is an important factor for the pricing strategies of plat-
forms. Multi homing is basically, if an agent of a group can join more than one platform
at the same time, this means he can multi home. In [Choi, 2007] paper the tying op-
tions is analyzed in two sided markets where the agents can multi home. Their paper is
also motivated from Microsoft tying policies. In their model there are two platforms A
and B. Hotelling model is used to create product differentiation, there are buyers and
sellers. They found out that tying can be welfare enhancing when the agents can multi
home, because tying makes consumers to multi home more, which is also beneficial for
agents of seller side.
To determine our model, the above papers’ approaches are investigated elabo-
rately. Therefore we can say that our model involves some of both markets’ dynamics
and mechanisms.
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Chapter 3
MODEL
In the model there are two firms and two components; A and B. Each composite
good includes one unit of A and one unit of B. The value of using the composite good
AB will depend on the qualities of both A and B. Component A will represent the
product of content providers and component B will be the product of access providers.
So composite good AB will represent the internet service and obviously its quality
depends on both the quality of the content and the quality of the network. We will
denote this value with;
VAB = f(qA, qB)
We will assume there are no cost of producing either component. The firms
only incur investment costs for their component’s quality. Let k > 0 denote the cost
parameter. As k becomes larger, investment cost increases.
C(qi) =
kq2i
4
As it is mentioned before the content providers do not charge internet users and
get external benefit when users visit their contents. Let α > 0 denote the external
benefit of the firm A for each user using the composite good AB. As the number of
visitors increases, advertisement revenues go up for content providers. However we
know that access providers charge internet user for using internet. Firm B will get
profit by charging the users for buying AB with the price of PAB. We investigate the
effect of a contractual relationship between the firms, therefore we will assume firm B
will charge firm A with a constant price for each user. In the model PA will denote the
price firm A will pay to firm B for each user. n will denote the number of consumers
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of composite good AB. With these notifications the firms’ profits can be written as;
ΠA = (α− PA)n− kq
2
A
4
(3.1)
ΠB = (PAB + PA)n− kq
2
B
4
(3.2)
We assume there is a continuum of users with mass M where M is sufficiently
large. Each user has a unit demand for AB. The consumer will purchase one unit of
AB, if his utility is positive otherwise he will purchase nothing. The utility depends
not only on the value of VAB and the price PAB but also the heterogeneity parameter ξ.
Here ξ represents the affinity of a consumer using internet service. The smaller is the
value of ξ the more likely it is that a consumer would like to purchase composite good
AB. We assume ξ has a uniform density function distributed on the interval [0,M ] with
a density of 1.
Ui = VAB − PAB − ξi ξi ∼ U(0,M) (3.3)
For a given VAB and PAB there exist a consumer i whose ξi = VAB−PAB therefore
he will be indifferent between buying or not buying the composite good. Consumers
whose ξs are smaller than ξi, will have positive utilities and prefer to buy the good.
Those whose ξ > ξi will not buy anything. The number of users is;
n =
∫ VAB−PAB
0
dξi
n = VAB − PAB
As the value of the composite good increases, the number of buyers increases, and as
the price of the good increases the number of buyers decreases.
We search for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the model. The sequence of
the events are;
1. Firms of components agree on the contract between them. i.e firm B decides on
a PA.
2. Knowing the contract decision, firms simultaneously decide on the profit maxi-
mizing quality levels.
3. Knowing the contract between the firms and the value of the composite good firm
B sets the price of composite good AB that consumers will pay.
To find the equilibrium, we start with the last step where the firm of B sets the
price of composite good. If we substitute the number of users into the equation 3.2 the
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profit function of firm B yields;
ΠB = (PAB + PA)(VAB − PAB)− kq
2
B
4
The profit is a concave function of PAB and there is a value of PAB which maximizes
the profit function, therefore it can be easily verified that optimal PAB* and n* are;
P ∗AB =
VAB − PA
2
n∗ =
VAB + PA
2
(3.4)
Substituting the values in 3.4 into the firms’ profit functions 3.1 and 3.2 yields;
ΠA = (α− PA)VAB + PA
2
− kq
2
A
4
(3.5)
ΠB = (
VAB + PA
2
)2 − kq
2
B
4
(3.6)
The consumer surplus can be computed as;
CS =
∫ VAB−PAB
0
(VAB − PAB − ξi)dξi
CS =
∫ VAB+PA
2
0
(
VAB + PA
2
− ξi)dξi
CS =
1
2
(
VAB + PA
2
)2 (3.7)
The second step where the firms decide on their components’ qualities is closely
related to how the value function is set, because of this reason, in the following sections
different kinds of value functions will be analyzed.
3.1 Perfect Complements
In this section, we analyze the value function where the qualities of the components are
perfect complements. i e;
VAB = min(aqA, bqB) (3.8)
In this value function a > 0 and b > 0 are the marginal contributions of the components’
qualities to the final value of the composite good. Their incentives on investment depend
on the other firm’s quality contribution. If one of them does not contribute to quality
the other firm can not increase the value of AB. In the case of net neutrality, to increase
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the quality of the internet service both content provider and access provider have to
increase their quality levels at the same time. The value of the composite good can be
written as;
VAB =
{
aqA if qA ≤ bqBa
bqB if qB ≤ aqAb
(3.9)
If the value function is substituted into the profit function of firm A;
ΠA =
{
(α− PA)aqA+PA2 − k(qA)
2
4
if qA ≤ bqBa
(α− PA) bqB+PA2 − k(qA)
2
4
if qA >
bqB
a
(3.10)
Also the profit function of firm B becomes;
ΠB =
{
( bqB+PA
2
)2 − k(qB)2
4
if qB ≤ aqAb
(aqA+PA
2
)2 − k(qB)2
4
if qB >
aqA
b
(3.11)
At the second step of the model, knowing the price between the firms, both firms
simultaneously decide on their quality contribution levels. While they are making these
decisions they will take into account other firm’s quality decision.
Proposition 1: If k > b2 holds, both profits are concave functions of their
qualities. There will be multiple Nash equilibria. The equilibrium values of the quality
contributions are q∗A =
1
a
q∗ and q∗B =
1
b
q∗ where q∗ is the equilibrium value of the
composite good AB;
V ∗AB = q
∗ ≤ min[ b
2PA
k − b2 ,
a2(α− PA)
k
]
Proof. If we look at the profit function of firm A, we can see that the first part of
the profit function is concave function of qA. Therefore we can find a qA value which
maximizes the first part.
∂ΠA
∂q
=
a(α− PA)
2
− kq
2
= 0 (3.12)
q̂A =
a(α− PA)
k
Firm A will contribute to quality until it does not increase the profit, therefore qA has
to be equal or less than q̂A. Besides increasing qA more than
bqB
a
will not increase the
profits. Therefore firm A’s best response function will be;
BRA =
1
a
min[
a2(α− PA)
k
, bqB]
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If we look at the profit function of B; the first part of the profit function is convex
in qB if k < b
2 which means higher qB values always increase the profit of firm B, however
if k > b2 ΠB will be a concave function of qB and we can find a profit maximizing qB
from the first order condition1;
∂ΠB
∂qB
=
bqB + PA
2
− kq
2
= 0
q̂B =
bPA
k − b2
Therefore firm B will contribute to quality until it does not increase the profit,
therefore qB has to be equal or less than q̂B. Besides increasing qB more than
aqA
b
will
not increase the profits so the best response function of firm B is;
BRB =
1
b
min[
b2PA
k − b2 , aqa]
When we solve two best response functions together, if the following conditions hold;
aqA <
b2PA
k − b2 and bqB <
a2(α− PA)
k
the firms will contribute to their own components’ qualities such that aqA = bqB.
therefore we can define the Nash Equilibria values such;
qA =
q∗
a
and qB =
q∗
b
where;
q∗ ≤ min[ b
2PA
k − b2 ,
a2(α− PA)
k
]
Therefore there will be a continuum of the Nash equilibria in this model and each
equilibrium values yield different profits for firms. Therefore the firms prefer one of the
Nash equilibrium more than the others. The Nash Equilibrium which both firms will
prefer is the Pareto efficient equilibrium of this model.
Lemma 1: The Pareto optimal equilibrium of the above Nash Equilibria is
defined as;
qA =
q∗
a
and qB =
q∗
b
1We will assume k > b2 holds in the rest of our analysis since it is necessary for concavity.
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where;
q∗ = min[
b2PA
k − b2 ,
a2(α− PA)
k
]
Proof. If we substitute the Nash equilibrium values of q, qA and qB into profit functions
of firms, the profit functions can be written as;
ΠA = (α− PA)q + PA
2
− k
4
(
q
a
)2
ΠB = (
q + PA
2
)2 − k
4
(
q
b
)2
Both profit functions are concave in q, therefore we can find optimal q value for each
profit function from first order conditions. For firm A the profit maximizing q is;
∂ΠA
∂q
=
α− PA
2
− k
2
(
q
a2
) = 0
q′ =
a2(α− PA)
k
However for firm B, the profit maximizing q value is;
∂ΠB
∂q
=
q + PA
2
− k
2
(
q
b2
) = 0
q′′ =
b2PA
k − b2
For any q∗ smaller than both q′ and q′′ increasing q∗ will increase both producers
profits. Because of this reason they both prefer to increase their qualities at the same
time to increase q∗. Therefore the Pareto optimal q* value is the minimum of q′ and
q′′, and Pareto optimal quality level will be;
qA =
q∗
a
and qB =
q∗
b
Case 1:In this part we will investigate the case where;
0 ≤ PA ≤ α(1− kb
2
kb2 + a2(k − b2))
Lemma 2: If the following condition holds;
0 ≤ PA ≤ α(1− kb
2
kb2 + a2(k − b2))
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then the Pareto optimal value of the composite good and Pareto optimal quality con-
tributions will be;
VAB =
b2PA
k − b2 (3.13)
q∗A =
b2PA
a(k − b2) q
∗
B =
bPA
(k − b2) (3.14)
where both quality contribution levels are increasing in b, PA while decreasing in k,
besides as a increases optimal q∗A decreases.
Proof. The optimal value of the q∗ depends on the value of the q′ and q′′. When PA = 0
q′′ = 0 while q′ > 0 and as PA increases q′′ increases and q′ decreases, therefore there
exist a PA where q
′ = q′′ and for PA values smaller than PA Pareto optimal value will
be q∗ = q′′ and PA values bigger than PA the Pareto optimal value will be q∗ = q′.The
altering PA is;
PA = α(1− kb
2
kb2 + a2(k − b2)) (3.15)
Since α , k, a, b, k − b2 are positive values PA will be between 0 and α. Then if PA is
between 0 and PA the Pareto optimal quality contribution levels and the value of the
composite good will be;
V = q′′ q∗A =
q′′
a
and q∗B =
q′′
b
where
q′′ =
b2PA
k − b2
We investigate how the parameters effect the Pareto optimal equilibrium values
of the qualities. The derivatives of the quality levels with respect to PA gives;
∂qA
∂PA
=
b2
a(k − b2)
∂qB
∂PA
=
b
k − b2
Since b , a, k − b2 are positive values, the above derivatives are positive which means
as PA increases both quality levels will increase.
Besides if we take the derivative of the quality levels with respect to b;
∂qA
∂b
=
2bkPA
a(k − b2)2
∂qB
∂b
=
PA(k − b2 + 2b)
(k − b2)2
Since a, k, b, k− b2 are positive whenever PA > 0 the above derivatives will be positive
18
which means as b increases both qualities increase.
The derivative of the quality levels with respect to k gives;
∂qA
∂k
= − b
2PA
a(k − b2)2
∂qB
∂k
= − bPA
(k − b2)2
Since a, b are positive, whenever PA > 0 the above derivatives will be negative which
means as k increases both quality contribution levels decrease.
The derivative of the quality of firm A with respect to a gives;
∂qA
∂k
= − b
2PA
a2(k − b2)
Since k − b2 is positive, whenever PA > 0 the above derivative will be negative, which
means as a increases firm A’s contribution level decreases.
When PA increases both firms will contribute to quality more, because when PA
increases firm B will gain more for each user which means the marginal returns of
investing to quality increases for firm B. Therefore firm B will invest in quality more.
Since firm A’s best response is increasing with qB, he will also contribute more.
Like the increase in PA when b increases both firms will also contribute to quality
more, because when B component’s marginal contribution to the value of the final good
increases, firm B’s marginal return of investing to quality increases. Therefore firm B
will invest in quality more. Since firm A’s best response is increasing with qB, he will
also contribute more.
On the other hand, when k increases both firms will contribute to quality less,
because when the cost parameter increases investing in quality for firm B becomes
more costly which means the marginal cost of investing to quality increases for firm B.
Therefore firm B will invest in quality less. Since firm A’s best response is increasing
with qB, he will also invest in quality less.
Furthermore as a increases firm A decreases optimal qA value because, firm A’s
best response function is decreasing with a, therefore as the marginal contribution of
A increases since qB does not change firm B will contribute to quality less.
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Effects of PA on the profits of the firms and consumer surplus when qualities
are complements
If we substitute the Pareto optimal value of the composite good into equation 3.4, price
of the final good and number of consumers become;
PAB =
(2b2 − k)PA
2(k − b2) and n =
kPA
2(k − b2)
Substituting these values into the profit function of the firms yields:
ΠA = (α− PA) kPA
2(k − b2) −
k
4
(
b2PA
a(k − b2))
2 (3.16)
ΠB =
k(PA)
2
4(k − b2) (3.17)
If we substitute the Pareto optimal equilibrium values into 3.7. Consumer surplus
becomes;
CS =
1
2
(
kPA
2(k − b2))
2 (3.18)
When there is no contract between the producers. i. e. PA = 0. Both profits and
consumer surplus will be zero, because the firm B will have no incentive for investing
in quality, consequently the quality of the final good, its price become 0 which makes
the market collapse. Because of this reason how parties will be effected when PA is
introduced must be analyzed.
Proposition 2: When the price between the firms increased from 0 both firms’
profits increase.
Proof. First we will take the derivative of value function with respect to PA;
∂VAB
∂PA
=
2b
k − b2 (3.19)
Since b and k− b2 are positive, increasing PA from 0 will increase the value of the final
good.
If we take the derivative of profit function of firm A with respect to PA yields;
∂ΠA
∂PA
=
k(α− 2PA)
2(k − b2) −
kb4PA
2a2(k − b2) (3.20)
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The above derivative is concave in PA and at the point where PA = 0 the derivative is;
∂ΠA
∂PA
|PA=0=
kα
2(k − b2)
Since k, α and k − b2 are positive values the above derivative will be positive which
means as PA is increased from 0, profit of firm A also increases.
If we take the derivative of profit function of firm B with respect to PA yields;
∂ΠB
∂PA
=
k(PA)
2(k − b2) (3.21)
Since k and k−b2 are positive values for any PA > 0 the above derivative will be positive
which means the profit of firm B is convex and increasing PA will provide higher profits
for firm of B.
Case 2: In this part we will investigate the case where;
α(1− kb
2
kb2 + a2(k − b2)) ≤ PA ≤ α
As it mention before as PA increases the optimal q
∗ switches from q′′ to q′. With
the above assumption q∗ = q′, therefore, the pareto optimal value of the final good and
the equilibrium quality values will be;
VAB = q
∗ =
(α− PA)a2
k
q∗A =
(α− PA)a
k
and q∗B =
(α− PA)a2
kb
Until PA attains PA, the equilibrium value of the composite good and equilibrium
qualities of the components increase, however as PA exceeds PA they start to decrease
and when PA reaches to α both Pareto optimal equilibrium qualities and value of the
composite good becomes 0. Therefore the maximum value of these variables are attained
when PA = PA
When we substitute the Pareto equilibrium quantities into 3.5 and 3.6 the profit
functions of firms turn into;
ΠA = (α− PA)(α− PA)a
2 + kPA
2k
− (α− PA)
2a2
4k
(3.22)
ΠB = (
αa2 + PA(k − a2)
2k
)2 − (α− PA)
2a4
4kb2
(3.23)
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To investigate how increasing PA more than PA effects the profit of firm A we
have;
∂ΠA
∂PA
=
(α− PA)(a2 − k)− PAk
2k
If k − a2 < 0 holds for any PA ≥ 0 the derivative above will be negative which means
increasing PA more than PA decreases the profit of firm A.
The contract agreement between the firms when qualities are complements
The decision for the contactual relationship between the firms is done as the first step
of the sequences of the events. firm B will try to maximize his profit by choosing PA.
Proposition 2: If a2 > k holds, firm A set a positive PA which is in the interval
[PA , α].
Proof. As it is mentioned before for different ranges of PA the profit function of B
changes. If we look at equation 3.17 and 3.21 when PA < PA the profit function is
convex in PA, therefore increasing PA increases ΠB. we can conclude that firm B will
never set PA less than PA. However when PA > PA with the above assumption, the
profit function of firm B is concave 2 in PA, and the derivative of ΠB with respect PA
gives;
∂ΠB
∂PA
=
PA(k − a2)2 + αa2(k − a2)
2k2
+
(α− PA)a4
2kb2
Since profit function of firm B is concave we can find an optimal PA value from equating
above first order condition to 0. The optimal PA is;
P ∗A =
αa2[a2(b2 − k)− kb2]
(k − a2)2b2 − ka4 (3.24)
P ∗A is bigger than PA and smaller than α. In the appendix the necessary conditions
and the details of the proof is explained. Therefore we can conclude that increasing PA
increases the profit of firm B until P ∗A. Therefore the equilibrium value of PA will be
P ∗A
The reason why firm B chooses the above price is that as it is already mentioned,
before when PA = 0 firm B’s profit is 0, however as PA begins to increase in equations
3.13 and 3.14 we see that both firms gain incentives for investment and VAB increases.
Also in equation 3.4 the number of consumers increases as the value of the composite
good increases. As a consequence, until PA = PA the marginal benefit of investing in
quality is always higher than the marginal cost of quality investments. However when
2See Appendix for the proof
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PA exceeds PA the incentives on investment changes and both firms prefer to decrease
their quality contribution which leads to a lower value of the composite good and less
consumer. That’s why the revenue of firm B begins to decrease, but at the same time
the cost of investing also decreases. The cost decrease dominates the revenue decrease
until PA = P
∗
A and after P
∗
A the profits starts to decrease. That is why firm B will
choose P ∗A as the price between the firms.
Nevertheless if a social planner decides on the price who wants to maximize welfare
of the consumers, he will choose the price which maximizes the consumer surplus. For
PA < PA consumer surplus is
CS =
1
2
(
kPA
2(k − b2))
2
If we take derivative of CS with respect to PA;
∂CS
∂PA
=
PA
4
(
k
k − b2 )
2
The above derivative is positive for any PA > 0 and the consumer surplus function
is convex in PA, which indicates that increasing price will always increase consumer
surplus in the interval where 0 < PA < PA. Therefore the social planner never sets the
price smaller than PA. For PA > PA consumer surplus is
CS =
1
2
(
αa2 + PA(k − a2)
2k
)2
If we take derivative of CS with respect to PA;
∂CS
∂PA
=
[αa2 + PA(k − a2)](k − a2)
4k2
If k − a2 is negative the above derivative will be negative where PA is in the
interval [PA, α] which means increasing PA more than PA decreases consumer surplus.
Therefore the social planner who wants to maximize wellbeing of the consumers will
set the price between the firms equal to PA.
The intuition is simple. We know that until PA = PA the firms will have incentives
for increasing their quality. Therefore as PA increase the value of the composite good
and the number of consumers increase until PA, but when PA exceeds PA the firms
prefer to invest less in the quality which leads to lower value of the final good and less
consumers. That’s why as PA increases from 0 to PA the consumer surplus increases
and it reaches its maximum at PA = PA and after that price level the consumer surplus
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decreases. Therefore consumer surplus maximizing PA value is PA.
Finally, if a social planner who wants to maximize the total welfare of the economy,
he will maximize the sum of firms profits and consumer surplus which is;
W = CS +ΠA +ΠB (3.25)
Under some conditions, W function is concave in PA and we can find a welfare maxi-
mizing PA which is smaller than α and bigger than PA which is;
PwA = α(1−
(3b2a2k − k2b2)
−3 b2a4 + 4 b2a2k + k2b2 + 2 a4k (3.26)
The proof of this and the welfare maximizing PA value is given in appendix.
3.2 Quality Substitutes
In this section, we will analyze the value function where the contributions of
qualities of the components to the quality of the final good are substitutes to each
other. i e;
VAB =
{
aqA + bqB if A and B both exist
0 otherwise
(3.27)
a and b are the marginal contributions of the components’ qualities to the value of the
final good. As it is seen in the equation the marginal contribution of each component’s
quality is independent of the other components’ quality. When we have this value
function, we can substitute aqA + bqB for all VAB in the profit functions of firms.
ΠA = (α− PA)aqA + bqB + PA
2
− kq
2
A
4
(3.28)
ΠB = (
aqA + bqB + PA
2
)2 − kq
2
B
4
(3.29)
At the second step of the setting, knowing PA each component firms will try to maximize
its profit by choosing their component’s quality levels. While making their decisions,
they will take into account other firm’s quality decisions.
Proposition 3: If k > b2 holds, both profits will be concave functions of the
qualities, the equilibrium will be;
q∗A =
a(α− PA)
k
and q∗B =
a2bα + bPA(k − a2)
k(k − b2) (3.30)
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qA* is increasing in a and α while it is decreasing in k and PA. qB* is increasing in a,
b and α while it is decreasing in k. Also if a2 > k qB is decreasing in PA.
Proof. In equation 3.31 it is seen that the firm A’s marginal cost of contributing to
quality is an increasing function however its marginal revenue is constant. For this
reason we can find a qA where firm A maximizes its profit. Besides in equation 3.32
firm B’s both marginal revenue and marginal cost of contributing to quality is increasing
function. If k < b2 increasing the quality will always increase the profits, however if
k > b2 holds profit of B will be a concave function of qB therefore we can find an
optimum for qB as well. With the assumption of k > b
2, the first order conditions are;
∂ΠA
∂qA
=
a(α− PA)
2
− kqA
2
= 0
∂ΠB
∂qB
=
b(aqA + bqB + PA)
2
− kqB
2
= 0
From the first order conditions we can obtain how firms will respond to other firm’s
quality decisions. firm A’s quality contribution decision is independent of qB,
qA =
a(α− PA)
k
however firm B has a best response function that increases with qA
BRB =
abqA + bPA
k − b2
If we substitute the optimal qA value into the best response function of firm B, the
profit maximizing qA* and qB* are;
q∗A =
a(α− PA)
k
q∗B =
a2bα + bPA(k − a2)
k(k − b2) (3.31)
The effects of a , b , k ,PA, α on the equilibrium quality levels can be easily derived
from the above equations. If I take the derivatives of both quality level with respect to
α;
∂q∗A
∂α
=
a
k
∂q∗B
∂α
=
a2b
k(k − b2)
Since a, b, k, k − b2 are positive values the above derivatives are positive which means
when α increases both q∗A and q
∗
B increase.
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The derivatives of equilibrium qualities with respect to a and b yields;
∂q∗A
∂a
=
α− PA
k
∂q∗B
∂b
=
(a2α+ PA(k − a2))(k + b2)
k(k − b2)2
Since a, b, k, α − PA, α are positive values the above derivatives are positive which
means when a increases q∗A increases and when b increases q
∗
B increases.
The derivatives of equilibrium qualities with respect to k yields;
∂q∗A
∂k
= −a(α− PA)
k2
∂q∗B
∂k
= −b(a
2(α− PA)(2k − b2) + k2PA
k2(k − b2)2
Since a, b, k, α − PA, α k − b2 are positive values the above derivatives are negative
which means as k increases q∗A and q
∗
B decrease.
Finally the derivatives of equilibrium qualities with respect to PA yields;
∂q∗A
∂PA
= −a
k
∂q∗B
∂PA
=
b(k − a2)
k(k − b2)
Since a, b, k, k−b2 are positive values the first derivative above is negative which means
as PA increases q
∗
A decreases. Also, if a
2 > k the second derivative will be negative which
means as PA increases q
∗
B decreases.
qB* increases with qA*, because when the firm A contribute to the quality, the
value of the final good increases which leads to larger number of consumers and higher
price firm B can charge the consumers. Therefore marginal return of contributing to
quality increases for firm B, and any increase in qA increases the incentives of firm B on
investment. However a change in qB can not effect the incentives of firm A’s investment
decision because, the marginal return of contributing to quality is α−PA
2
. In the net
neutrality case, we can say that an increase in content quality triggers access provider’s
investment on quality. However, if access providers contribute to quality, even though
the profit of content provider increases, he sustains the same quality contribution level.
Furthermore, when α increases both qualities increase. The reason of it is when
the external benefit of firm A increases, he will get higher marginal returns for each
costumer, therefore he will prefer to invest in quality more, since quality contribution
increases the value of the final good which leads to a higher number of users. As it
is explained above, when qA increases qB increases as well. So whenever the external
benefit of firm A increases both firms will invest in quality more. In the context of
internet, if content providers can get higher external benefits for each visitor visiting
their websites, both content’s and network’s qualities increase.
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In addition, when a increases qA* and when b increases qB* increases, because
when the marginal contributions of the qualities to the final good of the composite
good increase the returns of investing to quality will be higher for both firms which will
increase incentives for investment on quality. Obviously when k gets bigger, marginal
cost of investment will increase which will obviously decrease the incentives of the firms
for investing which leads to lower quality contributions of the firms.
When PA increases qA* decreases and qB* increases. The reason of it is as the
price that the firm A will pay to the firm B increases, each consumer will provide
smaller revenues for firm A, so the firm A’s marginal return for contributing to quality
decreases which reduces the incentives for investment. Besides, if a2 > k there are two
effects; first, when PA increases, the reduction of qA decreases the incentives of firm
B. On the other hand when PA increases, each user will provide higher revenues which
increases the incentives of firm B. if a2 > k the first effect dominates the second effect
of the increase in PA which leads to lower quality levels for both firms.
Effects of PA on the profits of the firms and consumer surplus when qualities
are substitutes
If we substitute the optimal quality levels into Value function we have;
VAB =
a2α+ PA(b
2 − a2)
k − b2 (3.32)
Since price of the composite good AB and the number of consumers are functions of
VAB. When we substitute the above VAB into PAB and n we have;
PAB =
a2α+ PA(2b
2 − a2 − k)
2(k − b2)
n =
a2α+ PA(k − a2)
2(k − b2) (3.33)
Knowing both optimal quality levels, equilibrium price of the composite good, and the
number of consumers in terms of the parameters. The profit functions of the firms
become;
ΠA = (α− PA)a
2α+ PA(k − a2)
2k − 2b2 −
k
4
(
a(α− PA)
k
)2 (3.34)
ΠB = (
a2α+ PA(k − a2)
2k − 2b2 )
2(1− b
2
k
) (3.35)
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If we substitute the equilibrium values of the qualities and prices into the consumer
surplus to find the wellbeing of the users, we get;
CS =
1
2
(
a2α+ PA(k − a2)
2k − 2b2 )
2 (3.36)
The main question of this paper is how will the existence of the contracts between
the firms will effect the wellbeing of each side, so we will analyze the above profit
functions and the consumer surplus when the PA = 0 and when PA > 0.
Proposition 4: The effect of introducing PA depends on the values of k, a, b.
When PA is increased form 0 if a
2 > k holds, the value of the composite good decreases.
Also ΠA, ΠB and CS decrease.
Proof. When price between the firms increased to a positive number from 0, how the
firms and consumers will be effected will depend on the below derivatives.
If we take the derivative of VAB with respect to PA;
∂VAB
∂PA
=
b2 − a2
k − b2
By assumption we know k− b2 is positive, then if a2 > k since k > b2, b will eventually
be less than a. Then the above derivative will be negative which means an increase in
PA will decrease VAB.
The derivative of ΠA with respect to PA yields;
∂ΠA
∂PA
|PA=0=
α(k − 2a2)
2k − 2b2 +
a2α
2k
=
α(k(k − a2)− a2b2))
2k(k − b2)
Since α, k− b2 and k are positive values if a2 > k, the above derivative will be positive
which means an increase in PA will decrease ΠA.
The derivative of ΠB with respect to PA yields;
∂ΠB
∂PA
|PA=0=
a2α(k − a2)(1− b2
k
)
2(k − b2)2
Since α and 1 − b2
k
are positive values if a2 > k the above derivative will be negative
which means as PA increases, the firm B’s profit decreases.
The derivative of CS with respect to PA yields;
∂ CS
∂PA
|PA=0=
a2α(k − a2)
4(k − b2)2
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Since α is a positive value if a2 > k the above derivative will be negative which means
as PA increases, consumers are worse off.
When a2 > k, an increase in PA will decrease VAB, because if a
2 > k, increasing
PA will decrease the optimal qA and optimal qB. Therefore both decreases in quality
contributions will lead to a lower value of the final good.
If a2 > k when PA is increased from 0, the firm A will lose profits, because if
we look at equation 3.1 we see that, when the price between the firms increases, firm
A gains less for each consumer, and the value of the composite good decreases, which
leads to smaller profits for firm A.
When PA increases if a
2 > k, firm B will lose profits and consumers are worse
off, because when we look at the equation 3.6 and 3.7, we can see that an increase in
PA has two effects; it decreases the value of the composite good which decreases the
profit and consumer surplus while it directly increases the profit of firm of B and the
consumer surplus, if a2 > k first effect will dominate the second one which decreases
the profit of firm B and consumer surplus.
To show how each parameter changes the effect of PA on the value of the final
good, profit of the producers and consumer surplus we let one parameter change while
fixing the other parameters.
In figure 3.1, the relation between a and derivatives of V ,ΠA ΠB, CS with respect
to PA is given. The other parameters are fixed; k = 4, b = 1, α = 1. As a changes
the effect of introducing a price mechanism changes. If a is small when PA is increased
from 0 all parties of the economy; the firms of components and consumers get better
and also value of the composite good increases. However as a increases and exceeds a
certain level, the profit of both firms and consumer surplus decreases and VAB decreases
if PA is increased. Therefore as a increases all parties lose their will for the existence
of price mechanism between the firms.
The reason of the above is; if a becomes larger, when PA is introduced the decrease
in qA* becomes larger. It is seen in the equation 3.31. Also since qA* reduction decreases
qB* at the same time, a large a can lead to a decrease in both qualities and a lower value
of the final good. Also if a2 > k a lower value of the composite good decreases both the
price of the composite good and the number of consumers. Therefore if the marginal
contribution of the component A is sufficiently large, all firms and consumers prefer
not to have a pricing mechanism. In the context of internet case, if content providers’
percentage on contributing to the value of the internet is high, charging them with a
positive price will lead to lower qualities of internet and hurts content providers, access
providers and the consumers.
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In figure 3.2, the relation between b and derivatives of V ,ΠA ΠB, CS with respect
to PA is given.The other parameters are fixed; k = 16, a = 2, α = 1. As ”b” increases
all parties willingness to have a price mechanism increases, because when b is large if
PA is increased from 0, firms of the components get higher profits, consumers are better
off and the value of the composite good is larger.
The reason of the above is; when b gets larger, if PA > 0 is introduced, the
increase in qB gets larger, which leads to higher values of the final good. Also as b gets
larger in equation 3.33 it is seen that n and PAB increases. Therefore if the marginal
contribution of the component B is sufficiently large, all firms and consumers prefer to
have a pricing mechanism. In the context of internet case, if access providers’ percentage
on contributing to the value of the internet is high, charging them with a positive price
will lead to higher qualities of internet service and content providers, access providers
and the consumers will be better off.
In figure 3.3,the relation between k and derivatives of V ,ΠA ΠB, CS with respect
to PA is given.The other parameters are fixed; a = 1, b = 2, α = 1. For all values
of k the derivatives are positive, but as ”k” increases all derivatives converge to 0
except the ∂ΠA
∂PA
. Therefore as k increases, the marginal benefit of introducing a price
mechanism decreases. Consumers and the firm B get smaller marginal profits. However
∂ΠA
∂PA
converges to 0.5 which means as k increases the firm of A’s will also decreases but
still, he will always prefer to have a positive positive PA since in any k a positive PA
provides positive profit for him.
As k increase all the optimal quality level , price of the final good and number
of consumers decrease. Therefore, the effects of introducing a price mechanism also
decreases for all parties of the economy. On the other hand as α; the external benefit
of firm of A increases, all optimal values increase, therefore introduction of a price
mechanism positively effects the parties of the economy.
Lemma 3: When PA = 0, as a, b or α increases, both firms’ profits, value of the
final good and consumer surplus increase. On the other side an increase in k decreases
all the profits, the value of the final good and consumer surplus.
Proof. When PA = 0 all the profits, consumer surplus, and value of the composite good
equations become simpler. The value of the composite good becomes;
VAB =
a2α
k − b2 (3.37)
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Figure 3.1: ”a” and ∂VAB∂PA
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Figure 3.2: ”b” and ∂VAB∂PA
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Figure 3.3: ”k” and ∂VAB∂PA
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For how the parameters; a, b, α, k effect the value of the composite good we have;
∂VAB
∂a
=
2aα
k − b2
∂VAB
∂b
=
(a2α)2b
(k − b2)2
∂VAB
∂α
=
a2
k − b2
∂VAB
∂k
= − a
2α
(k − b2)2
Since a, b, k − b2 α are positive values, the first three derivatives are positive values
while, the last one is negative, which means as a, b or α increases the value of final
good increases.
When price between the firms set to 0, the profit of firm A becomes;
ΠA =
a2α2
2k − 2b2 −
a2α2
4k
(3.38)
For how the parameters; a, b, α, k effect the profit of firm A we have;
∂ΠA
∂a
=
aα2
k − b2 −
aα2
2k
∂ΠA
∂b
=
(a2α2)b
(k − b2)2
∂ΠA
∂α
=
a2α
k − b2 −
a2α
2k
∂ΠA
∂k
= − a
2α2
2(k − b2)2 +
a2α2
4k2
Since a, b α, k, k − b2 are positive the first three derivatives will be positive and the
last one will be negative which means as a, b α increase profit of A increases, however
as k increases the profit of A decreases.
When PA = 0 the profit of firm B becomes;
ΠB =
a4α2
4k(k − b2) (3.39)
If we take the derivatives of ΠB with respect to a, b α, k;
∂ΠB
∂a
=
a3α2
k(k − b2)
∂ΠB
∂b
=
a4α2b
2k(k − b2)2
∂ΠB
∂α
=
a4α
2k(k − b2)
∂ΠB
∂k
= −a
4α2(2k − b2)
4k2(k − b2)2
Since a, b, k, α, k − b2 are positive values the first three derivatives will be positive
and the last one will be negative which means as a, b α increase profit of B increases,
however as k increases the profit of A decreases.
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If PA = 0 consumer surplus is;
CS =
1
8
(
a2α
k − b2 )
2 (3.40)
If we take the derivatives of consumer surplus with respect to a, b α, k;
∂CS
∂a
=
a3α2
2(k − b2)2
∂CS
∂b
=
a4α2b
2(k − b2)3
∂CS
∂α
=
a4α
2(k − b2)2
∂CS
∂k
= −a
4α2(2k − b2)
4(k − b2)3
Since a, b, k, α, k − b2 are positive values the first three derivatives will be positive
and the last one will be negative which means as a, b or α increases consumer surplus
increases, however as k increases consumer surplus decreases.
The contract agreement between the firms when qualities are substitutes
The first step of the sequence of the events is deciding the price between the firms.
Firm B will try to maximize his own profit by choosing PA. Taking the derivative of
his profit function with respect to PA yields;
∂ΠB
∂PA
=
[a2(α− PA) + PAk](k − a2)
2k2(k − b2)
Since k − b2, k, α − PA, a are positive, if k − a2 is negative the above derivative will
be negative for PA in interval [0, α]. Increasing PA will decrease profit of firm of B.
Therefore the firm B will choose the price;
PA = 0
Therefore the profits of firms will be;
ΠA =
a2α2
2k − 2b2 −
a2α2
4k
ΠB =
a4α2
4k(k − b2)
The reason why firm B chooses not to charge firm A is; whenever PA is increased
from 0, as it is explained before both firms decrease their quality level, which leads
smaller value of the composite good. Besides in equation 3.4 the number of consumers
depends on VAB and PA. When PA is increased the decrease in VAB is larger than
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the increase in PA which causes a decrease in the number of consumers. Therefore,
introducing PA is not profitable for firm B.
However if a social planner decides the price between the firms who wants to
maximize wellbeing of the consumers:
∂CS
∂PA
=
[αa2 + PA(k − a2)](k − a2)
4(k − b2)2
If k−a2 is negative, above derivative will be negative. For all values of PA in the interval
[0 , α] increasing PA decreases the consumer surplus. Therefore the social planner will
set the PA = 0 If the price is substituted into the consumer surplus;
CS =
1
8
(
a2α
k − b2 )
2
Like in the analysis of firm B’s profits, the consumer do not prefer a price between
firms, because as PA increases both the value of the composite good and the number
of user decrease which decreases the wellbeing of the society.
Finally if the social planner wants to maximize the total welfare of the economy,
he will maximize the sum of the profits and consumer surplus which is;
W = CS +ΠA +ΠB
We know than if a2 > k, when PA = 0 each derivative of consumer surplus, profit of
firm A and profit of firm B with respect to PA are negative which means increasing PA
does not increase either of the profits or consumer surplus, therefore the social planner
who wants to maximize the total welfare will choose to set the price equal to 0.
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Chapter 4
FINDINGS OF THE MODEL
4.1 Comparison of the Findings
In this section we will analyze the findings of the model and compare the results of
quality complement case with the results of quality substitute case. While making this
comparison we will assume the square of marginal contribution of firm A is larger than
the cost parameter, and the square of firm B’s marginal contribution is smaller than
the cost parameter. i. e. a2 > k > b2. This means firm A has higher incentives for
investing in quality compared to firm B. Besides we will denote the quality complement
case with QC case, and the quality substitutes case with QS case.
Result 1: When PA = 0, in QC case, the market collapses which results in 0
profits of both firms and 0 consumer surplus, however in QS case all firms and consumer
surplus is positive.
The reason of the above result is, in QC case when PA = 0 even though the firm
A’s quality level is sufficiently large, with the above assumption investing in the quality
can not increase the profits of firm B (equation 3.11). Therefore firm B does not prefer
to invest in quality. Since the qualities are complements, the other firm does not invest
in quality either which makes the value of the composite good 0. Consequently both
firms gain 0 profit and consumer surplus is 0.
However in QS case, when PA = 0 even though the firm B does not invest, firm
A can increase the value of the composite good. It is shown that firm A finds investing
in quality profitable and the decision of investing in quality for firm A is independent
from qB. On the other hand, if we look at the equation 3.32, the profit function of
firm B is increasing in qB and an increase in qA increases the incentives of firm B. As
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the number of consumers increases, firm B’s marginal returns for investing in quality
increases which leads to positive quality contributions and positive value of the final
good. Therefore both firms gain positive profits and consumer surplus is positive.
Result 2: As PA increase from 0, for QC case, both firms increase their invest-
ments which lead to a higher value of the final good, however in QS case, both firms
decrease their investments which lead to a lower value of the final good.
The reason is; in QC case, if qA is positive, an increase in PA increases the incen-
tives of firm B, and if qB is positive firm A also prefers to invest in quality, therefore
they both increase their quality levels. However, as it is already mentioned, in QS case,
firm A’s investment decision is independent of qB, also his decision is decreasing with
PA. Therefore qA decreases. Since qB is increasing function of qA, when qA decreases
even though each consumers provide higher for each consumer, because of the decrease
in the value of the composite good and the number of consumers, firm B also loses
incentives for investment and decreases his quality level. So in QS case the value of the
composite good is maximum when PA = 0.
Result 3: For QC case, there is a positive PA value where the value of the
composite good is maximum.
Until PA = PA, both firms find investing in quality profitable, however when PA
exceeds PA firm A prefers to decrease its quality level which also decreases incentives
of firm B. Therefore at PA = PA value of the composite good is maximum in QC case.
Result 4: Consumer surplus maximizing PA is PA for QC case, while for QS case
it is 0.
In both cases wellbeing of the consumers is totally related with value of the com-
posite good, therefore in both cases, consumers prefer the prices where value of the
composite good is maximized which is PA = 0 for QS case, and PA = PA for QC case.
Result 5: Firm B’s profit maximizing PA choice is 0 for QS case, however for
QC case, P ∗A is positive and higher than PA.
We assumed that the marginal contribution of component A is larger than both
cost parameter and marginal contribution of component B, and in QS case we know
that when qA decreases that marginal return of investing in quality decreases for firm
B. Also firm B’s profit function is increasing in qA. Therefore whenever PA increases,
the decrease in qA strongly worsens all the variables of economy. For this reason, even
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though PA provides revenue for firm B, because of the negative effects of the decrease
in qA, firm B prefers not to charge firm A in QS case. However in QC case increasing
PA increases both sides’ incentives therefore firm B finds profitable to set a positive
PA. Nevertheless he does not prefer PA which maximizes the value of the product but,
prefers P ∗A > PA, because after PA, increasing PA decreases the cost of investment and
revenues at the same time which provides extra profit until PA = P
∗
A.
Result 6: If a social planner who wants to maximize the total welfare of the
economy, determines the price between firms. In QS case he will set a price equal to 0,
and in QC case he will chooses a positive PwA .
In QS case, when PA > 0 is introduced all quality levels, value of the final good
and the number of consumers decrease, therefore none of the parties of economy can
benefit from an increase in PA. Therefore total welfare is maximized when PA = 0.
However in QC case, the increase in PA creates incentives for investment and increases
the profits and consumer surplus. Therefore there is a positive PA which a social planner
would choose to maximize the total welfare of the economy.
4.2 The Implication of Findings on Net Neutrality
Debate
Net neutrality debate was the main motive of this thesis, because of that, in this section,
we will explain what the findings of our model can imply on the world wide web market.
As it is mentioned previously, the content providers are represented as firm A and
access providers are represented as firm B, and internet service’s value is determined
with a function of both content’s and network’s qualities. Besides we analyzed the
internet market assuming that content’s quality’s marginal contribution is higher than
network’s quality’s.
In the analysis of the model, the effects of introducing a price between the firms
depends on how qualities of components are related to each other. This paper analyzed
two extreme value functions; perfect quality substitutes and perfect quality complements.
Introducing PA increases the welfare when the qualities of components are complements
while when the qualities of components are substitutes increasing PA decreases the total
welfare. Therefore the relation between the components of internet service is important.
If we assume that the qualities of network and content are perfect quality substi-
tutes, we would defend the neutrality of internet. We would conclude that there should
be no contracts between the access provider and the content providers, since it hurts
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all parties in the economy. Actually if the parties allowed to have a contract between
them, they will set the price equal to 0. If content providers are charged, they will
prefer to invest less in quality which means they will not develop new applications or
improve their softwares. This will decrease the number of internet users and value of the
internet service, which will also decrease the access providers incentives on improving
its network’s quality.
If we assume that the qualities of network and content are perfect quality com-
plements, we would be an opponent of net neutrality. We would conclude that there
should be a positive price between the access providers and content providers, because
when the internet is neutral, the access providers do not have incentives for investment
in quality, which prevents the increase in internet’s quality. Even though the content
providers could find investing in quality profitable, since the access providers do not
invest in quality, they also do not invest, which leads to lower quality of the internet
service. Therefore the content providers should give some of their external benefit to
access providers to increase the quality of internet service and the number of consumers.
This policy is welfare improving for the society.
On the other hand, like in most of composite goods comprising two components,
it is difficult to determine how internet service’s quality is determined. The network
and content are perfect complements, however they are not perfect quality complements
because when the quality of content’s increases without any improvement in network
quality, the internet service’s value increases, also we can not think them as perfect
quality substitutes since their qualities’ contributions on the value are not independent
of each other. Because of this reason we can only conclude that if the relationship
between the components of internet service is closer to being quality complements,
there should be a positive price between the access providers and content providers,
but if the relationship is closer to being substitutes, internet should stay neutral.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyzed the effect of contractual relationships on the investment
incentives of complementary good producers. The motivating idea was the debate on
a specific two-sided market namely World Wide Web. Therefore in our analysis, we
collated the dynamics of both two-sided markets and complementary goods market.
In our model, like in two-sided markets, the seller side (firm A) and the buyer side
(consumers) did not interact with each others directly, the platform (firm B) interact
with both of them and charged prices for each of them to maximize profits. However
since there were only one firm as the producer of A and one firm as the producer of B, the
model was also illustrating a market of composite goods comprising two complementary
components.
We analyzed two specific value function; perfect complements and perfect sub-
stitutes. We commented on the net neutrality debate with the help of our findings.
As future work we will analyze our model with different value functions such as Cobb
Douglas which can represent the internet market better.
Also, our work can be extended in two-sided markets. The number of sellers
and the number platforms can be increased, since there are many content providers in
internet and more than one access providers.
My main finding is, in composite good markets if the components are closer to
being quality components introducing price between the firms of components increases
welfare, however if the components are closer to being quality substitutes there should
be no price between the firms. Therefore this paper highlights the fact that the optimal
solution for the debate about net neutrality can be found by determining how the
qualities of content and network are related to each other.
41
Chapter A
APPENDIX
A.1 The PA choice of firm A when qualities are com-
plements
In this section we will explain the mathematical calculations of how firm B choose the
optimal PA to maximize its profit. When PA in interval [0, PA], the profit function is;
ΠB =
k(PA)
2
4(k − b2) (A.1)
If look at the first and second derivatives;
∂ΠB
∂PA
=
k(PA)
2(k − b2) ≥ 0
∂2ΠB
∂2PA
=
k
2(k − b2) > 0 (A.2)
When PA is in interval [0, PA] the profit function is increasing and convex in PA.
Therefore firm B will never set the price less than PA.
When PA is in interval [PA, α] the profit function is;
ΠB = (
αa2 + PA(k − a2)
2k
)2 − (α− PA)
2a4
4kb2
(A.3)
If we look at the first and second derivative of the above function;
∂ΠB
∂PA
=
PA(k − a2)2 + αa2(k − a2)
2k2
+
(α− PA)a4
2kb2
(A.4)
∂2ΠB
∂2PA
=
(k − a2)2
2k2
− a
4
2kb2
(A.5)
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If we substitute PA = 0 in the first derivative, we get;
∂ΠB
∂PA
|PA=0=
b2αa2(k − a2)
2k2b2
+
kαa4
2k2b2
(A.6)
Since the denominators are the same and positive, if the sum of the numerators are
positive it means above function is increasing in PA which is;
b2αa2(k − a2) + kαa4
If we rearrange the equation it becomes;
αa4(k − b2) + αa2b2k
since k − b2 is positive by assumption we can conclude that the sum of numerators are
positive so ΠB is increasing in PA.
Concavity of the profit function:
As PA increases ΠB increases, however if the profit function is concave we can find
a PA when profit of firm B has its maximum , therefore the second derivative must be
negative. If we rearrange the second derivative of profit of firm B with respect to PA
∂2ΠB
∂2PA
=
(k − a2)2b2 − a4k
2k2b2
The denominator is positive if we rearrange the numerator;
a4(b2 − k) + b2k(k − 2a2)
By assumption, b2 − k is negative, if the k − 2a2 < 0 holds the above function will
be negative, then the numerator will negative which means the second derivative is
negative and profit function is concave.
Whether P ∗A is bigger than PA.
Then we found the profit maximizing P ∗A value by equating first derivative equal
to 0. The optimal PA has to be bigger than PA because the profit function is valid for
the interval [PA, α]. The difference between the optimal price and PA is;
P ∗A − PA =
α a2 (−b2a2 + kb2 + a2k)
−b2a4 + 2 b2a2k − k2b2 + a4k − α
(
1− kb
2
kb2 + a2 (−b2 + k)
)
(A.7)
=
α a2k3b2
(−b2a4 + 2 b2a2k − k2b2 + a4k) (−b2a2 + kb2 + a2k) (A.8)
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The numerator is positive, if the denominator is also positive we can conclude that P ∗A
larger than PA. The first part of the denominator is:(−b2a4 + 2 b2a2k − k2b2 + a4k)
If we rearrange it;
a4
(−b2 + k)+ kb2 (2 a2 − k)
Since k − b2 is if 2a2 − k is positive the first part of the denominator is positive. The
second part of the denominator is
(−b2a2 + kb2 + a2k)
If we rearrange it;
a2
(−b2 + k)+ kb2
Since k − b2 is positive the second part is also positive then I have;
+
(+)(+)
Which is positive, therefore we can conclude that P ∗A > PA.
Whether P ∗A is smaller than α.
If P ∗A is smaller than α. α− P ∗A has to be positive;
α− P ∗A = α−
α a2 (−b2a2 + kb2 + a2k)
−b2a4 + 2 b2a2k − k2b2 + a4k
=
α kb2 (a2 − k)
−b2a4 + 2 b2a2k − k2b2 + a4k (A.9)
If a2 − k is positive the numerator will be positive, the denominator is also positive,
therefore we can say that P ∗A is smaller than α.
The benefit of having the assumption: a2 > k
If k > a2, we know that the optimal price of firm B will be higher than α. If PA is
larger or equal to α, the value of the composite good and the quality contributions will
be less than or equal to 0 which makes the effects of quality contributions unimportant
for gaining profits. However if k < a2 PA is less than α. The value of the final good and
quality contributions are positive. Besides with the assumption of k < a2 the concavity
of profit function and P ∗A > PA is also satisfied.
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A.2 Welfare maximizing PA value when components
are complements
Total welfare of the economy is;
W = CS +ΠA +ΠB; (A.10)
If take the first and second derivatives of the function we have;
∂W
∂PA
= −1/4 3αa
4b2 − αa2kb2 − 3 b2PA a4 + 4 b2PA a2k + b2k2PA − 2 k2b2α− 2αa4k + 2 a4kPA
k2b2
∂2W
∂2PA
= −1/4 −3 b
2a4 + 4 b2a2k + k2b2 + 2 a4k
k2b2
(A.11)
Necessary condition for the concavity of welfare function
If the second derivative is negative, welfare function will be concave, since denom-
inator is positive, if
−3 b2a4 + 4 b2a2k + k2b2 + 2 a4k
is positive the profit function will be concave. If we rearrange the above equation
−2 b2a4 + 2 a4k − b2a4 + 4 b2a2k + k2b2
which is;
2 a4(k − b2) + a2b2(4k − a2) + k2b2
As the assumption we know that k− b2 is positive therefore the necessary condition for
concavity is;
4k > a2 (A.12)
Since welfare function is concave we can equate the first derivative to 0;
PwA = α−
α kb2 (3 a2 − k)
−3 b2a4 + 4 b2a2k + k2b2 + 2 a4k (A.13)
Since the denominator and 3a2 > k are positive, we can say that PwA less than α.
Whether PwA is bigger than PA
If PwA is bigger than PA the following equation has to be positive;
PwA − PA = −
k2b2α (a4 − a2k − 2 kb2)
(−3 b2a4 + 4 b2a2k + k2b2 + 2 a4k) (−b2a2 + kb2 + a2k)
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We know that the first part of the denominator is positive the second part is;
(−b2a2 + kb2 + a2k)
If we rearrange it;
a2(k − b2) + kb2
Since k − b2 is positive the denominator will be positive. Therefore if
(
a4 − a2k − 2 kb2)
is negative PwA will be bigger than PA.
Whether PwA is bigger than P
∗
A
If PwA is smaller than P
∗
A. P
∗
A − PwA has to be positive which is;
α k2b2 (−2 b2a2k + a6 + a4k + 2 k2b2)
(−b2a4 + 2 b2a2k − k2b2 + a4k) (−3 b2a4 + 4 b2a2k + k2b2 + 2 a4k)
We know that (−3 b2a4 + 4 b2a2k + k2b2 + 2 a4k)
is positive. The other element of denominator is;
(−b2a4 + 2 b2a2k − k2b2 + a4k)
If we rearrange it;
a4(k − b2) + kb2(2a2 − k)
Since k− b2 is positive if a2 > k the denominator is positive. The numerator is positive
if; (−2 b2a2k + a6 + a4k + 2 k2b2)
The necessary condition for the numerator to be positive is a2 > k, because when a2 > k
a6 + a4k > 2a4k > 2a2b2k
Therefore if a2 > k the welfare optimal price between firms will be between PA and P
∗
A
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